Planning or Forced Transfer?
The Case of Palestinian Bedouin Communities

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Jerusalem Legal Aid & Human Rights Center - JLAC

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Preface by JLAC

This study is published by the Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center (JLAC) as part of its advocacy project for the support of Palestinian Bedouins, supported by the German Representative Office in Ramallah. The study focuses on the economic and social impacts of the forcible displacement plan, which targets Bedouin communities in the central West Bank and aims at grouping them in a new semi-refugee camps established on the lands of Al-Nuweima and al-Doyouk villages west of Jericho.

For the purpose of conducting the study, the Center contracted the anthropological researcher, Ahmad Heneiti, who focused on the lifestyle, culture and livelihoods of the targeted Bedouin communities. He also examined the social architecture pattern of these communities, as well as, conducted interviews with their representatives, economists, and agronomists, in addition to a literature review of the few prior previous studies on the matter.

Following the issuance of the draft research, a focus group workshop of selected communities affected by the plan was conducted with the participation of a number of experts. The session included a presentation of the study, discussion of its findings as well as verifying the credibility of its recommendations and the extent to which such recommendations express the reality of these communities. The recommendations were developed based on this workshop.

In addition to its chapters, the study includes a set of appendices, including the proceedings of the above mentioned workshop Moreover, a summary of a legal paper, prepared by two legal experts on international humanitarian law (Professor Marco Sassioli and Dr. Théo Boutruche) which concluded that the Bedouin relocation plan of Bedouins would amount to forcible transfer, which constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Moreover, the study also includes a collection of photos and maps illustrating the current social architecture pattern of Bedouin communities, by which the typical space for an economically independent Bedouin family is about three and a quarter dunums, allocated for residential, social, women’s household chores, and sheep barracks (of various kinds). It should be noted that these patterns do not reflect the optimal use of space by the Bedouin and are the direct result of the policies and practices of the ICA limiting their space.

Bedouins included in this study (and residing in the eastern hillsides of the central West Bank and the areas of Khan al-Ahmar and central Jordan Valley) have agreed on their rejection the plan, considering it an uprooting plan that would also result in devastating impacts on their culture and livelihoods. The plan is also seen as deeming to
their dignity, by resulting in their unemployed and total dependence on aid. Moreover, such a plan would turn their locations of residence into socially tense hotbeds for crime and delinquency. Furthermore, interviewed Bedouins specifically focused on the plan’s adverse effects pertaining to women’s private space, which would ultimately turn houses into prisons for women depriving them of their economic role and the margins of freedom of movement associated with such role.

Whether through interviews or workshops, Bedouins demanded that the planning of the development of their lives within each gathering be conducted with their full participation, taking into consideration their social and cultural particularity, their lifestyle, and livelihoods. The workshop also called for the formation of a cross-sectoral working group (comprised of representatives from the Palestinian National Authority and its ministries in addition to all concerned NGOs and grassroots organizations) mandated with the promoting the adoption of supportive policies for the existence of Bedouins and preserving their identity and culture (as a source of enrichment of the Palestinian culture and its diversity), maintaining their economic role in food security for the Palestinians, and guaranteeing them a fair share of the Palestinian development plans.

At first glance, Bedouins may appear to be fortunate on account of the multitude of parties bearing responsibility towards them, i.e. the Palestinian National Authority (as Palestinian citizens), Israel (as protected residents of areas “C” which falls under the jurisdiction of the Israeli military), and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency-UNRWA (as 70% of Bedouins in the 46 Central West Bank communities targeted for transfer are refugees). In reality, however, such has only amounted to Bedouins being neglected and (in the case of Israel) even systemically violated. For despite the minimal resources allotted to Bedouins by the PA and efforts on the part of UNRWA to improve service delivery to Bedouins, these communities (as a result of the restrictive policies of the Israeli authorities, for instance Palestinians residing in urban areas in the Palestinian territory have access to PA and UNRWA facilities directly within their vicinity while Bedouin do not) fail to enjoy the range of services rendered to other sectors of the Palestinian society. For instance, Palestinian refugees residing in camps in the Palestinian Territory have access to UNRWA schools and clinics (among other services) directly within their vicinities, while Bedouin communities do not. Indeed, these shortcomings and the violations imposed by Israel have collectively placed Bedouins in the position of being the most marginalized and at risk Palestinian group.

Issam Aruri
JLAC Director
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Introduction

The Israeli Civil Administration has announced a plan to relocate approximately 12,500 Bedouins residing in different communities in the governorates of Ramallah, Jerusalem and Jericho to the lands of Al-Nuweima village, near the city of Jericho. This study will attempt to explore and analyze the social, cultural and economic impacts this plan will have on the lives of the targeted Bedouin communities. In this regard, the study will consist of three main sections. The first section tackles the cultural, social and economic situation of Bedouin communities in their current locations of residence, including the mechanisms employed by the communities in confronting Israeli policies and their resilience in preserving their indigenous culture and way of life. The second section addresses the discriminatory planning and conditions set by the Israeli Civil Administration for licensing buildings, as well as, the introduction of relocation plans and methods of land distribution and land uses therein. The last section of the study sheds light on the social, cultural and economic impacts on Bedouin communities in the event of forced displacement by Al-Nuweima Plan.

The communities encompassed by the study are dispersed in the eastern areas of Ramallah and the western foothills of the Jordan Valley, near the city of Jericho, and scattered in the area east of Jerusalem (excluding communities in al-Jabali area east of the town of Bethany). The relocation plan will come to forcefully displace the communities to the area of Tal Al-Nuweima, north of the city of Jericho. It is worth mentioning that all of these communities are situated in areas classified by the Oslo Accords as “Area C”.

This study was conducted between late September and late December of 2014. The study methodology involved interviews with six representatives from among the Bedouin communities targeted for displacement, as well as seven individuals living in the communities. An interview was also conducted with a
member of the projects committee in al-Jabal Camp were Bedouin communities have been residing since their forceful displacement in the late 1990s as to learn from their experience. Other interviews were conducted with two experts, from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture specializing in livestock (and mandated with Bedouin affairs) and another expert working in agricultural relief. The study also entailed attending four meetings on the subject of the proposed plan, in the presence of experts. A focus group was held on December 16, 2014 comprised of representative from Bedouin communities, representatives from organizations targeting Bedouins, and the head of Bedouin Affairs at the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture. The study was shared with the group and discussed towards ensuring the accuracy of the information, integrity of the recommendations, and the extent of the approval of Bedouin community representatives of the study. The interviews, which were closer in nature to discussions and dialogue, tackled the current situation of those communities and aimed at gauging perceptions on how the relocation plan (referred to in this study as Al-Nuweima plan) is perceived.
The Current Status of Bedouins

Bedouins scattered in the West Bank are originally from the Negev desert from which they were displaced in 1948. Others were displaced following the cease-fire in 1951. Reports indicate that 70% of Bedouins are Palestine refugees. Community leader Abu Khamis shared his account: “we were displaced following the cease-fire in 1951 for refusing to cooperate with the Israelis”. Following their displacement from the Negev desert, especially the northeast Negev, Tel Arad and south of Hebron, part of these tribes immigrated to Jordan while others opted to stay in the West Bank. Those whom came to the West Bank came to be scattered in all areas of the region, in varying densities. For instance, Bedouins in the north and west of the West Bank are comprised of small individual families, whereas those in the southern and central regions as well as the Jordan Valley are comprised of highly populated communities. Bedouins living in the central area of the West Bank are distributed in three main tribes: al-Ka‘abneh, al’Rashaydah and al-Jahhalin, each of which is broken down into smaller families.

Displaced Bedouins refused to live in camps and were rather scattered in locations compatible with their nomadic lifestyle, such as the semi-arid lands in the Hebron area. According to community leader, Abu Suleiman: “Of course Bedouins are scattered in the West Bank. They refused to live in camps like the rest of the Palestine refugees because they were hoping to return quickly to their homeland. Furthermore, Bedouins, in nature, reside in deserts and their economy is highly dependent on the desert along with their livestock, particularly, camels. In order to preserve their traditional way of life, they chose to avoid residence in cities, villages, and camps as to not be confined and lose their culture and traditions”.

Therefore, Bedouins were dispersed in the West Bank areas, mainly in pastoral, semi-arid and sparsely-populated areas in the central West Bank. However, the limited capacity of pastoral resources could not absorb the growing number in livestock. This resulted in competition and, eventually, resistance by villagers to accommodate Bedouins living and grazing animals near their lands. For instance, residents’ large reserves of livestock in south Hebron have resulted in crisis between neighboring Bedouins, pertaining to pastures and water sources (Heneiti 2010: 174).

Falah (1989) highlights several elements leading Bedouins to settle down
and forgo a nomadic lifestyle. He classifies those elements into two types: general and specific. Both are interrelated and cannot be easily separated or distinguished. The general elements include the improvement of security and law conditions, the demographic density within the Bedouin community, urbanization and mingling with residents who are sedentary. However, the specific components encompass environmental, economic and political factors as well as social and cultural factors. All these elements are interrelated and integrated and should be taken into account in analyzing and understanding the settlement and living conditions of Bedouins in the West Bank. Thus, the study shall address these elements as a whole.

Falah suggests two demographic factors which have contributed to the sedentary shift of Bedouins' lifestyle. Both factors emanate from the imbalance between the growing number of Bedouins and livestock, and the capacity of the available area of land to accommodate this growth. The changes in the number of livestock have led to a state of instability for Bedouins (Falah 1989: 28).

Regarding the first factor:
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A consequential detachment from the social unity occurs in a tribe or clan in the event of scarcity in grazing land. As a result, some families may leave their locations to seek alternative pastures. Failure in finding such alternative pastures for developmental reasons or other reasons related to changes in land uses or for political or administrative reasons by which Bedouins' access to existing pastures is denied, would leave Bedouins with the option of selling their cattle and abandoning their pastoral lifestyle and replace it with a new stable living pattern, such as the reliance on agriculture and paid labor for income (Falah 1989: 28-29).

Therefore, such instability (i.e. change in the economic structure) would entail a change in the social and cultural structure as a consequence. This would eventually lead to the fragmentation of the tribal system driving many individuals to move to urban areas to seek job opportunities, and thus, Bedouins would gradually abandon their nomadic lifestyle.

The second factor prompting Bedouins to abandon a nomadic lifestyle:

The gradual adoption of supplementary sources of living, would allow for the community to maintain a consistent livestock size despite natural growth of the human population and insufficient sources of grazing land. The adoption of supplemental living sources, along with an increased demographic reproduction, would create, in the long run, a gradual increase in the reliance on such sources. Bedouins, hence, would come to adopt a new pattern of a sedentary lifestyle linked to their place of work (Falah 1989: 28-29).

Nevertheless, there are other factors in addition to the above two prompting Bedouins to seek a sedentary life. Such include the proximity of Bedouin communities to cities and villages and the availability of opportunities for interactions with such communities, though such contact did not serve to achieve cultural harmony or eliminate cultural discrimination. Moreover, given Bedouins' marginalization from surrounding communities, they encounter difficulties in meeting increasing service needs associated with an urban life (i.e. infrastructural, public, education, health, etc.). Attempting to interpret the
situation of Bedouins in the West Bank, we find that these factors have affected their lives, in terms of forgoing their indigenous way of life.

Additional factors which have contributed to the forced settlement of Bedouins involve certain practices of the Israeli occupation. Such practices include denial of access to grazing land for livestock. Despite efforts to adapt and maintain their culture and lifestyle, Israeli practices have forced some Bedouin communities to abandon their nomadic way of life. For instance, in the 1990s Bedouin communities near the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim were forcefully relocated to the al-Jabal area, adjacent to the town of Bethany.

Following their forced displacement from the Negev desert to the West Bank, Bedouins continued to live a similar life of seasonal movement. Abundancy of land and freedom of movement are critical for the maintenance of living conditions and pattern of life. The region has large expanses of communal sparsely populated grazing lands with abundance of springs. Jamil speaks about Bedouins’ use of the land which they currently inhabit:

The majority of the households displaced from the Negev desert or Tel Arad area relocated to the area east of Hebron, as they had been utilizing these lands prior to 1948 for the quality of their grazing lands when southern areas witnesses droughts. Our family stayed in Wadi al-Qatif, and where they lived in tents. They would stay for two months then move to another mountainside. They did not have a stable location for each season of year. In summer, they resided in the mountains then headed back to the warm areas in the Jordan Valley in the winter.

Lands over which Bedouins reside in the central area of the West Bank are classified into four types of ownership: private ownership, Waqf land (charitable trust), ownership by families in the nearby villages and cities, village communal ownership and government or state property. For instance, the lands over which al-Muliehat group (part of al-Ka’abneh tribe) reside are owned by families from the village of Der Debwan, the Khan al-Ahmar lands are private property and others are communal for the town of Anata, al-Mu’arajat lands are classified as state property, and the Bedouin community Sath al-Bahir are situated on Islamic Waqf land.
A sealed letter, entitled “to whom it may concern”, signed by the mayor of Der Debwan, states: “This is to certify that the Der Debwan municipality, under special understandings with land owners and the municipality, has no objection for the Muleihat Sheiman Bedouin clan to reside in the area of Maghayer al Der, on the lands of Der Debwan at the current time. With the full knowledge of the people of Der Debwan, the clan has been given this certificate duly upon their request”.

Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, mainly in the late seventies and early eighties, Bedouin families began to settle gradually in these areas. The urbanization and sedentary process emerged as a result of Israeli pressures exerted against Bedouins (i.e. reducing areas allowed to be used by Bedouins for grazing and the control over springs). Jamil noted the reasons under which they have been forced to settle in their current communities, saying: “When you erect your tent in this area then return in winter, the Israelis would not allow that under the pretext that no residents were left in the area. Therefore, we had to remember our locations in order to be able to return to them. Moreover, being linked to a certain location due to engagement in schools and similar activities makes it impossible to keep moving children among schools from one area to another.”

Despite the discriminatory Israeli policies imposed against Bedouins, and in light of the growing Bedouin population and livestock, Bedouins were able to preserve their culture and way of life through income acquired from their livestock. They were also able to find many means by which they were able to preserve their nomadic lifestyle. Therefore, becoming sedentary did not prevent them from practicing most aspects of the Bedouin life. Such was achieved mainly their reliance on livestock as their primary source of income, as more than 90% of Bedouins in communities targeted for displacement rely on grazing as their primary source of income (OCHA, September 2014). However, 10% of Bedouins rely on other sources of income, particularly, labor in Israeli settlements (OCHA, unpublished data). Income generated from labor in settlements or fields other than grazing constitute supplementary sources of income. Israeli pressures aimed at discontinuing Bedouins way of life, mainly through reducing areas allowed for grazing and compelling them to engage in other sources of income, are the
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main reasons behind that 10% of Bedouins work in fields other than livestock. Furthermore, Israel has zoned large areas of the West Bank (accounting for more than 18%) as “closed military zones” for the purposes of military training or as “firing zones”. This area roughly represents the same area under full Palestinian control, Areas “A”, which represent 17.7% of the total area of the West Bank (OCHA 2013:3).

According to a study conducted by the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee in Jericho in the localities Jiftlik, Izbedat, Duke, and Al-Nuweima. Herders in the mentioned areas have approximately 28,473 livestock (sheep and goats), producing two 2,272 tons of milk per annum which is manufactured as follows: 67% to 379.3 tons of feta cheese and the remainder into 275.5 tons of yogurt (most of which is manufactured into yogurt paste), and 59.6 tons of drayed yogurt. The products are marketed and consumed locally, (PARC 2014). If these calculations are figured in, that means that each unit of livestock produces 79 liters of milk per annum. According to veterinary statistics certified from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture in 2013, the quantity of livestock in the Jerusalem governorate amounts to 41,125 animals producing 3,207.8 tons of milk per annum. In Jericho 65,301 animals produce 5,093.5 tons of milk and in Ramallah 35,724 animals produce 2,786.5 tons of milk per annum. Therefore, the three governorates, in which the Bedouin communities targeted for displacement by the Al-Nuweima plan reside in, herd 142,150 animals and produce 11,097.7 tons of milk per annum.

Bedouins adopted many means of preserving their lifestyle. Such means included scattering in small and relatively dispersed communities, with each Bedouin community consisting of two to three generations of the same family. For example, the Bedouin community in the area of Sath al-Bahar (which means in Arabic “sea level”) is comprised of three brothers, their children and grandchildren, i.e. 12 families and about 70 individuals who all descend from the same ancestors. Similarly, the Bedouin community in Utul Edweik are comprised of approximately 300 persons from among 32 families descend from the same ancestors. Such family fragmentation emerged in an attempt to adapt to the Israeli policies directed against Bedouins. The establishment of multiple families in the same community with large numbers of livestock resulted
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in overcrowded grazing areas, due to access restrictions and high rates of population growth among Bedouins. Collectively these factors prompted some families to move to more opportune locations for practicing their traditional way of life. Though such fragmentation occurred prior to the 1990s, today Bedouins are prohibited from moving to other locations in Area “C”.

Another means by which Bedouins preserved their lifestyle is through the adoption of seasonal movement of livestock, accompanied by some family members, as Bedouins constantly move between locations in correspondence with their living conditions. This approach is based on the seasonal movement of livestock, accompanied with some family members (as the majority of family members remain in their location of settlement in order to avoid displacement by Israeli forces) between three to five months of the year. For example, al-Hamadeen family, settling in the Bedouin community in the area of Sath al-Bahar, moved to the area west of Ramallah in the mountains situated between Beitunya and Ein Qiniya village. This migration with livestock (and some men, women and children of the family) lasts from the beginning of May until the beginning of October (the summer period). For instance, the family of Abu Hussein al-Rashaydah, settling in the Bedouin community of al-Nuweima al-Fawqa, moved with their livestock (along with some men, women and children of the family) to the lands of the village of al-Zawiyeh west of Salfit. Some family members had to remain in Al-Nuweima al-Fawqa Bedouin community in order to avoid its confiscation by the Israeli Civil Administration.

Bedouin communities were able to preserve their nomadic cultural characteristics, namely adherence to traditions and family honor and the fundamental element of family cohesion on the basis of kinship, as each grouping consists of two or three generations at most.

- **Bedouin families are usually large with an average of six to ten children.**
- **Some men have two or three wives with a number of children amounting up to 25.**
- **Marriage is usually an event that involves a network of families which forms the clan.** According to their traditions, it is preferred for Bedouin men to marry wives from the same family, clan or tribe.
- **Marriages are arranged through consultations and agreements between**
parents, uncles and cousins. Although marriages with non-Bedouins occur in some cases, the majority of Bedouins, however, strictly adhere to their traditions (Avendaño 2007: 22).

The scattered tents or tin houses of Bedouin families reflect one of the main features of spatial architecture in these communities, in which distance between families is no less than fifty meters. Proximity is maintained between houses of the same family, as the father and his married children. As Bedouin culture does not allow married sons to live with their wives in the same house of the family, as is common in Palestinian villages. Such reflects the importance of privacy and family honor in the Bedouin culture.

Families in the Bedouin gathering living in the area of Otl al-Doyouk adopted three architectural approaches of land use. It is worth noting in this context that the housing area (Durook al-Beit, which means the sanctity of the house in Arabic) is no less than three dunums. For example, the housing area of Mahmoud al-Rashaydeh is 3,582 sq meters (with 7 family member, 70 animals), and the housing area around each of his first cousins’ homes is similar, with Mohammed and Yousef’s housing areas being about 3,236 and 3,184 sq meters respectively (with 15 family members and 50 animals). These housing areas are utilized for the accommodation of housing barracks, sheep barracks, hospitality barracks, kitchens and bathrooms as well as other barracks for fodder and fowl. For instance, the housing area of Mohammed al-Rashaydeh (equaling 3,236 sq meters) is divided as follows: an approximate area of 145 square meters allocated for housing barracks (utilized for sleeping, particularly by females), 59 square meters allocated for a kitchen barracks, an area of 10 square meters is used for the “taboon” oven, two bathrooms behind these barracks, 46 square meters for a hospitality barracks, 71 square meters for sheep barracks, and about 203 square meters located between the housing and the kitchen barracks, as well as an area of about 23 square meters allocated for fodder barracks. In addition, there is a barn utilized for feeding animals, as well as its annexed facilities such as water cisterns etc., which amount collectively in area to approximately 700 sq meters. Mohammed al-Rashaydeh’s family is comprised of 12 members, of which 5 are married adults, with 100 animas. The reason behind maintaining a distance between the hospitality and housing
barracks is to keep women at a distance from the place where guests are received and seated. This would also allow women an appropriate space to move around freely within the vicinity of the housing barracks, enabling them to carry out their chores and economic activity (i.e. washing and hanging laundry, preparing meals, etc.) as these are tasks are usually conducted outside the sleeping barracks. In addition, there are other facilities like the hencoop, and the barn where the dogs and donkeys are kept, as well as, areas planted with vegetables to meet the needs of the family and the parking area for cars and tractors. Moreover, the family builds additional barns during the gestation and delivery period of sheep to keep particular sheep separated from each other. The families residing near the family of Mohammed al-Rashaydeh are those of his brothers’ and first cousins’, which makes the total area of land over which the extended large family resides on dozens of dunums. Mohammed al-Rashaydeh complains of the current restrictions in space, as it doesn’t satisfy his current needs.

The majority of Bedouin communities are located in Area “C”, i.e. areas fully controlled by the Israeli Civil Administration in terms of security, planning and land parceling, as well as other domains. Therefore, the development of the infrastructure in these communities has been very limited and almost impossible due to the Israeli policies which require obtaining the approval and authorization of the Israeli Civil Administration. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs –OCHA in the occupied Palestinian territories reported in August 2011:

70% of Area “C” lands are allocated for use by Israeli settlements or the Israeli army (including areas declared by the Israeli army as closed military zones). As for the remaining 30 percent, a series of other restrictions are imposed, significantly diminishing the possibility of obtaining a building license. More specifically, the Israeli Civil Administration allows construction by Palestinians in only less than one percent of Area “C”, where buildings are already erected. As a result, Palestinians who need to build in Area “C” are solely left with the option of building without obtaining a license and thus, placing their construction at risk of demolition (OCHA – August 2011: 10).
Some Bedouins managed to replace their tents with houses of tin. However, the Israeli Civil Administration and the Settlement Protection Services organized patrols to monitor these communities almost on daily basis in an effort to restrict the construction of houses and limit the development of the infrastructure in these communities. Reports on such monitoring, with recommendations to demolish houses and modern infrastructure in Bedouin communities, are submitted to the Israeli Civil Administration on a periodic basis. Furthermore, the absence of an equitable planning and zoning system in Area “C” means that the majority of Palestinians lack access to building permits for the construction or rehabilitation of houses, barns or basic infrastructure. For example, in recent years, the Israeli authorities demolished:

Until August of 2014, 340 structures were demolished in Area “C”, which caused the displacement of 668 people). While in 2013, 565 structures were demolished in Area “C”, including 208 residential buildings and 357 buildings used for other purposes, such as buildings utilized for livelihood (i.e. barns and infrastructure). Such resulted in the displacement of 805 people, more than half of them are children. Furthermore, 1,473 people were affected by the demolitions more than half of them were children. It is worth noting that there has been a 127% increase in the number of demolitions in the Jordan Valley, when compared to 2012 (from 172 demolished structures to 390); Bedouin and herding communities have been worst affected), OCHA 2014.

Moreover, demolitions of buildings and infrastructure in Area “C” also entailed those supervised and supported by international donors; 122 buildings were demolished compared to 79 in 2011 (OCHA – March 2014). Moreover, access roads to Bedouin communities and roads within these communities are jagged and dangerous making access to these communities or movement within the community by ordinary vehicles very difficult and particularly inaccessible by vehicles whatsoever in winter.

Furthermore, Bedouin communities (which more than 70% of which are either completely or mostly located in Area “C”), lack access to utility services leading some, consequently, to be dependent on solar energy or special generators for electricity supply. In addition, the majority of these communities
are not connected to water networks resulting in greater reliance on private water tanks for water supply, increasing costs significantly. The daily water consumption per capita in some Bedouin communities is 20 liters which is equivalent to 20% of the rate recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO - January 2013). Official domestic water consumption needs vary according family size, cost per unit square of water, and quantity of livestock. The average water consumption rate for livestock (specifically goats and sheep) is 6-8 liters per animal on daily basis in the winter and 8-12 liters per animal daily in summer, (UNDP 2013:49). In addition, Bedouin communities lack health centers and mobile clinics, and can only receive medical services in nearby villages and cities, which might be difficult in some instances to access, increasing their vulnerability.

Moreover, the majority of Bedouin communities are marginalized in regards to the availability of nearby schools. Schools are only available in two out of 41 Bedouin communities in the central area of the West Bank. However, these schools are constantly threatened by the risk of demolition by Israeli forces. In fact, all of these communities have received demolition notices issued by the Israeli Civil Administration. However, the Israeli Supreme Court froze the demolition orders for some schools until they can find alternative venues. Although the Palestinian Ministry of Education provided some of these communities with buses to transport pupils to schools in nearby villages and cities, the majority of students need to walk a long distance in order to reach their schools. This is a problem which further worsens in winter as movement gets more risky due to the danger of floods in valleys separating Bedouin communities and schools.

The deteriorating economic conditions facing Bedouins, coupled with their remoteness, has contributed to rising dropout rates among students, with only few members in a given Bedouin community having completed their basic education studies. However, Bedouin females, in particular, are deprived from education since distance between their vicinities of residence and schools is perceived by parents as a decisive reason to halt their enrollment in school, as the personal security of females (which is associated with family honor) is considered more important than education or other considerations.
The Israeli practices, manifested in the lack of housing construction and infrastructure development for Bedouins as comparable with the natural growth in population, limited educational and health services, limiting the number of houses connected to electricity and water networks, reduction in grazing areas, house demolition and denial of access to livelihoods, restriction in freedom of movement, (among other practices aimed at the displacement of Bedouins) have led to a drastic deterioration in the humanitarian situation in these communities compared to other Palestinian communities in surrounding villages and cities. The percentage of food insecurity among Bedouin communities has amounted 55% (after receiving aid) compared to a total average of 22% in the West Bank. However, the rate of food insecurity dropped from 79 percent to 55 percent during the period 2009-2010 (OCHA 2011) following the successful implementation of the food distribution initiative managed by the UNRWA and the World Food Program, in which Bedouin populations and herders in Area “C” were prioritized.

Bedouins consider the quantity of humanitarian aid offered to them by the PA and other entities as not sufficient to meeting their minimum basic needs and steadfastness against settlement expansion and associated threats as land confiscation. For instance, a PA governmental committee confined the amount of incurred losses in the demolition of a home by Israeli forces (under the guise of building without a permit) in the Bedouin community of upper Al-Nuweima to 25,000 USD. The PA offered the said home owners compensation in the amount of 1,000 USD, which was rejected by the victim. More recently, the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture specified 4 million NIS in financial support to Bedouin communities and herders. This amount is considered very low given each herder’s share will merely amount to 5-days’ worth of animal feed. Therefore, it is noticed that the Palestinian government is not following a long-term strategy towards the support of Bedouin communities and its intervention is dependent on annual donations without clear and transparent mechanisms of support.
The Urbanization of Bedouins and Al-Nuweima Plan

Planning concepts have been linked to the development processes of different countries and their efforts to advance economic and social conditions of their people. Thus, planning has been linked to the concepts of urbanization and modernization, as well as, other development concepts. Yiftachel notes: “Conventional wisdom portrays urban and regional planning as a progressive, reformist and modernist societal project. Consequently, planning has been conceived, by planners and public alike, as a rational professional activity, aimed at producing a ‘public good’ of one kind or another. Planning’s theoretical and professional discourse has therefore tended to concentrate on its capacity to contribute to the attainment of well-established societal goals, such as residential amenity, economic efficiency, social equity and environmental sustainability”, (Yiftachel 1998). Researchers and policy makers tend to use several terms and concepts to describe the plans targeting Bedouins, such as: “Bedouin settling”, “Bedouin settlement”, “Bedouin stabilization” and “Bedouin grouping”. Falah states that the term “Bedouin settlement”, for example, indicates that official occupation efforts are being made to change the existing nomadic nature of migration and movement between locations – and that such a nature is, of course, incompatible with the regional and development plans of a “civilized” state like Israel! That being said, government policies, therefore, seek to settle Bedouins in fixed locations, both for the public good and the good of Bedouins as well”, (Falah 1989: 168).

An associated goal of settling Bedouins into certain gatherings is the development of these communities. Bearing in mind the development process and its mechanisms, on one hand, and the life of constant movement which Bedouins practice, on the other, are “incompatible”. Their relocation or settlement in certain planned areas for development purposes emerges as an appropriate option for these communities. It is within this context that the concepts of relocation or settlement emerged to reflect this official transformation in Bedouin life. Resettlement is defined as “a set of processes enabling the stabilization and resettlement of Bedouin gatherings within a certain spatial location, be it their current locations or new appropriate areas,
and in line with their conditions, values, systems, basic needs, desires and behavioral patterns within a defined period of time, for the purpose of causing an intentional change in the prevailing social and economic lifestyle, traditions and behavioral patterns as well, in light of thoughtful local and national plans” (Abdul Rahman 1991: 67). Furthermore, resettlement also reflects “the process by which the elements of organized and structured economic stability and independence are provided for Bedouins in their current locations or, at least, in the nearest locations” (Abdul Rahman 1991: 68).

Hence, planning, as described above, may be considered positive planning (i.e. aimed at the improvement and development of people’s lives and the advancement of their social and economic conditions). Such was the case with the Egyptian government’s plan in north Sinai by which more than one million acres were reclaimed (an acre is equal to about four thousand square kilometers) and Bedouins were resettled there (Abdul Rahman 1991).

However, planning may be negative in some cases where it aims to control people and disenfranchise them of their cultural, social and economic resources and livelihoods. Such a negative planning policy is practiced by Israel in various locations and under different circumstances. Many studies concluded that the Israeli planning policies are meant to serve Jewish ethnic groups at the expense of Arab ethnic groups. Falah states, that the Negev regional plan evidently aims at “exploiting the natural resources in that area, ignoring the existence of Bedouins in that area, especially in terms of: the current pattern of land use by Bedouins, the extensive grazing activity, the spread of Bedouin houses in a low density area and the demands of Bedouin to own large tracts of land.” (Falah 1989: 175). Nevertheless, the content of items contained in either plans, or the so-called “area development”, was designed for the benefit of residents of the existing Jewish cities and the prospective agricultural settlements as well. As for Bedouin inhabitants, the plan pointed out that they will benefit after the establishment of the industrial zone” (Falah 1989: 175). Falah concludes that the primary goal of implementing the programmed relocation projects for Bedouins is “to seize Bedouin land after being evacuated, whether through land confiscation, closure or by making deals of exchange by which the Bedouin gets a larger share in the programmed relocation projects in return of selling or
abandoning their land in the Negev” (Falah 1989: 175). Yeftachel, who agrees with Falah on the objective of the plans prepared by the Israeli Civil Administration for Palestinians, said:

Land seizure and forced relocation of inhabitants are the most evident and severe manifestations. Since 1948, Israel has practiced a consistent policy aimed at the Judaization of the “land of Israel” or “historic Palestine”. This policy shows the establishment of about 1,100 Jewish only settlements situated in the area between Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, it destroyed more than 400 Arab villages and prohibited Arabs from building new neighborhoods anywhere on this land. The only exception was the imposition of forced urbanization of Bedouins in Galilee and Negev through which it had built about 28 Bedouin towns and villages so far. In the Negev area, the state of Israel reduced land acquisition by Bedouins, prohibited the return of refugees and marginalized Bedouins in sectors such as planning, development, education and local governance. (Yeftachel 2014: 289).

However, a study conducted by the UNRWA and Bimkom in al-Jabal area near the town of Abu Dis in the West Bank, occupied in 1967, noted that: 150 families from al-Salamat Jahaleen Bedouins, residing in areas targeted for the expansion of the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim”, had been displaced in three phases since 1997 (Bimkom and UNRWA 2011: 14). The same study further noted:

Currently, all dwellings in al-Jabal area, though at varying stages of construction (as some families have not been officially integrated in the village until 2007), are legally connected to water and electricity networks. However, a portion of the roads in that area are paved while the remainder are dirt roads, with vacant spaces usually utilized as sites for burning household waste. Though legally connected to electricity networks, the electricity supply, however, is mostly oscillating and temporary given that cables are, in many cases, hanging downwards and even reaching the ground level in some roads. Wandering across the village, one gets a mixed impression of an abandoned somewhat semi-urban environment. Though the existence of spacious houses, a village
committee and a big mosque indicate a relative affluence of population, the absence of attention to public spaces, however, indicates an inherent flaw in the way things are managed. The village also includes a new high school, a fact which starkly contradicts the condition of the worn out primary school characterized by below-standard buildings (including tin containers) and lacking window glass, an effective toilet system and basic equipment \((\text{UNRWA and BIMKOM 2011: 21})\).

The study noted that: Israeli practices, including the establishment of settlements, are considered illegal and incompatible with international law, by United Nations’ recognition. Paradoxically, some 39,000 inhabitants reside in the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, an illegitimate and unlawful entity according to international law. The settlement also includes 79 kindergartens, 20 schools and 7 swimming pools. The mayor of the settlement refers to it as “the sparkling pearl of the state of Israel” and “a high quality city for living in, with educational accomplishments, evolving trade and continuous community advancement that is attained with the contribution of its residents”\(, (\text{BIMKOM and UNRWA 2011: 16})\).

Israel has placed tremendous pressure on Bedouins residing in Area “C” in order to displace them to other locations and confiscate their lands. Mohieddin Saber calls this process “moral eviction”, which is primarily dependent on the eradication of Bedouins’ livelihood (characterized by isolated local economies and personal relations) towards dismantling their civilization and replacing it with the impersonal relations and thematic community action\(, (\text{Saber 1966: 47})\). It is within this context that the intentions of the Israeli occupation forces can be assessed. In spite of this policy, (manifested in reducing grazing areas, demolishing newly constructed houses and barns, and preventing the Bedouin from developing infrastructure,) Bedouins, however, managed to maintain their steadfastness in their gatherings under such policies violating their dignity and rights. However, after the failure of all the previous attempts aimed at the displacement of Bedouins, the Israeli Civil Administration issued demolition and eviction orders for many Bedouin gatherings, including those residing in the areas of Jerusalem, Ramallah and Jericho. Yet, as a result of the legal challenges filed by Bedouins against these orders and notices before
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Israeli courts, the Israeli Supreme Court decided to freeze the eviction orders (and consequent displacement) until alternative locations, appropriate for their lifestyle and meeting their needs, are found. Consequently, the Israeli Civil Administration succumbed to the decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, and thus designed three plans to be implemented in the central area of the West Bank for the relocation of the targeted Bedouin communities. These plans involved the Tal Al-Nuweima plan, which is considered the largest and aims to establish a Bedouin town in the area. This plan is composed of six schemes, three of which were published by the Israeli Civil Administration on August 25, 2014. Two of the published plans are for the establishment of residential areas and one for the construction of an access road to Al-Nuweima area. These three plans (along with the other three plans which have not been published yet) will be implemented on 1,400 small vacant land plots, indicating an intention to transfer more inhabitants. (Human Rights Watch 2014). However, Maj. Gen. Yoav Mordechai, Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories, noted in an Israeli parliamentary hearing on April 27, 2014, that plans are set as part of its policy aimed at the displacement of Bedouins from large areas in the West Bank in order to group and organize them in a proper and coordinated manner”, (Human Rights Watch 2014). Mordechai went on to describe: military plans are deemed necessary “in order to allow us to present the moral and legal justification later on” for the transfer of Bedouins from their existing communities. According to the Haaretz, the new town is consistent with the “dynamic changes” that have occurred in the lives of Bedouins who have moved from an agriculture-based community for income to a community reliant on trade, engineering works, services and so on”, (Human Rights Watch 2014). Nevertheless, this Israeli claim is untrue for several reasons which will be elaborated later on in this study. However, the following section discusses, in detail, the Al-Nuweima plan or as called by Bedouins, the Al-Nuweima Camp.

The master plan is composed of six interrelated sub-schemes for the establishment of a large camp, with a total area of 1,460 dunums allocated for the accommodation of some 12,500 Bedouins, in the Al-Nuweima area. These lands, are adjacent to Area “A” and are classified as State Land. Two of the six schemes, namely 1/1418 and 3/1417, suggest the establishment of main roads, byroads and
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The remaining schemes suggest the allocation of lands to be utilized as residential areas, industrial zones, engineering facilities, cemeteries, open (or archaeological) areas in addition to roads and public transportation stations. Each scheme will target a group of Bedouin families as will be detailed later in this research. Those schemes are as follows: scheme 1419, scheme 1418, scheme 214 /17 and scheme 1/14 /17. As elaborated in the detailed plans, these schemes aim at:

1. Identifying the boundaries of land portions.
2. Cancelling existing zoning and using lands as planned in the map.
3. Determining allowed uses of lands and buildings in all zoning areas.
4. Setting building rights and restrictions.
5. Clarifying the implementation of the plan, implementation stages, timelines and conditions for infrastructure construction.
6. Establishing the conditions for obtaining building permits.

The total number of housing blocks in the four schemes is about 1,120, with an approximate average area of 500 square meters each. However, a single housing block may include two housing units, a two- story each, with an area of about 170 square meters for each story, with the possibility of adding a basement and a storeroom with a maximum area of 25 square meters. However, in order to obtain approval for the building permit, the front of the building should be built of stone and a blueprint of the neighborhood, indicating the location of the housing unit comparative to the location of other units, should be submitted. As for the livestock and agricultural areas, the plan does not engage any agricultural activity, whether animal or botanical, i.e. there is no spaces allocated for barns, livestock, grazing or planting. Moreover, the plan did not officially identify the Bedouin communities to be transferred. According to an agricultural engineer at the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee (PARC), the application of scientific methods in cultivating livestock requires wide expansions of land, as each animal requires a minimum of 2 meters of space. In addition, each animal classification should be separated from the other (i.e. milking animals, gestating animals, males, etc.). Each classification requires different methods of feeding and other considerations.
Therefore, much space is needed. However, surveys conducted by international institutions operating in Bedouin clusters and verbal statements made by the Israeli Civil Administration and directed to certain Bedouin communities reveal that the total number of Bedouin communities proposed for transfer to Al-Nuweima is more than 20 cluster belonging to different tribes and clans, such as al-Jahaleen, al-Rashaydeh and al-Ka‘abneh. The following table illustrates the potentially targeted clusters (though this list is non-exhaustive):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Bedouin Cluster</th>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Bedouin Cluster</th>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Al-Mashrou’</td>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>Al-Jahaleen</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Al-Khan al-Ahmarr: Makab al-Samen</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Al-Jahaleen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Der al-Qilt</td>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Al-Khan al-Ahmarr: Abu Falah</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Al-Jahaleen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ein al-Qilt</td>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mikhmas Bedouin</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ein al-OUTja al-Fawqa</td>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Maghayer al-Deir</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh – al-Mleihat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jabal al-Baba</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Al-Jahaleen</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>East Taybeh</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sateh al-Bahr</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Al-Jahaleen</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ein Samia</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ma‘azi Jaba‘</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ras al-Teen</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jaba’ Bedouin Gathering</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Wadi al-Seeq</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Al-Kassarat</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Ein al-Rashrash</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>Al-Ka‘abneh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in the table above, Bedouin families to be displaced as suggested in the plan belong to different Bedouin clans which subdivide into Bedouin families. Thus, in order to clarify the nature of the schemes, we will address, in this context, one of the six schemes in detail. However, it should be noted that all four housing schemes are similar in their details, in terms of the size and nature of buildings.
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as well as land uses, licensing and approval conditions. Yet, these schemes vary in terms of size of the planned area, number of housing and commercial units, etc. The scheme described herein, as a case study, is scheme 1/ 1417 , designed for the accommodation of al-Rashaydeh, and bears the name al-Rashaydeh Western Village.

It is worth noting that the total area of land included in the plan is 85.5 dunums. The table below illustrates land uses as specified in the plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
<th>Proposed situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area (in dunums) %</td>
<td>Area (in dunums) %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing area “A” (agricultural village, housing area)</td>
<td>27.9 32.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade area</td>
<td>1.1 1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public buildings area</td>
<td>2.4 2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open spaces</td>
<td>29.8 34.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed road</td>
<td>24.1 28.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing or approved road</td>
<td>3.6 4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural area</td>
<td>81.9 95.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural road</td>
<td>0.2 0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85.5 100</td>
<td>85.5 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in the table above, the current area is entirely agricultural land. Yet, according to the plan, the agricultural area shall be changed to housing and commercial areas in addition to public buildings and roads. Therefore, this plan would eventually deprive Bedouins, targeted by this plan, from their current economic and agricultural resources, animal and botanical alike. Furthermore, as illustrated in the plan, the Israeli Civil Administration denies the existence of the Bedouin clusters currently living on the land, as the plan has no mention of any residential area when noting the current situation. Hence, such a plan does not accurately reflect the current situation since it ignores the existence of 32 Bedouin families, i.e. about 300 individuals, belonging to Arab al-Rashaydeh.

Furthermore, the plan specifies the uses of land plots in detail, prohibiting uses other than those specified in the plan. Though much detail is provided on conditions set for obtaining a permit for land use, however, the plan leaves many issues
ambiguous to be determined later on by the various Israeli authorities (specifically the Staff Officer on Environmental Affairs and relevant planning committees).

The area allocated for housing purposes for the 52 land plots amounts to a total area between 460 and 672 dunums, as well as another single land plot with a total area of 1,101 square meters. However, the maximum area of each building is 175 square meters. The plan allows the construction of two housing units in a single land plot (of half a dunum). Each housing unit shall consist of two floors in addition to a basement floor, as well as the possibility of adding an annex building with an area not exceeding 15 square meters to be used for non-commercial purposes. Moreover, building permits may be granted either in a single phase or in several phases depending on the current conditions. For example, construction may need to be undertaken in several stages, such as; obtaining approval for demolition of existing buildings, leveling and cementing land, meeting eligibility criteria to conduct construction of internal roads, obtaining needed approvals for construction maps, and final development of area. The detailed plan also includes specifications on the nature of the building, its shape and construction materials to be used as well as defining ways to establish its infrastructure and connect it to utility services and road networks, etc. Also, the plan requires that the front side of the building should be built of stone.

It is worth noting that when the Israeli Civil Administration conducted the designing process of the plan, it did not consult or communicate with Bedouins in the targeted communities. Abu Mohammed (a prominent member of the community) stated: “they are designing a plan targeting us and we do not know anything about it”. The Israeli Civil Administration did not even officially notify the targeted Bedouin communities about their intention to transfer them to that “camp”. However, Bedouins, on the other hand, believe that the plan is inconvenient for their needs and incompatible with their lifestyle and culture which they have managed to sustain in spite of pressures attempting their eradication. Moreover, such planning methods and mechanisms are inconsistent with the principles of urban planning, and this even applies to the Israeli Planning Treaty, which states:
Planners shall be committed before every human…. albeit different…. or belonging to a minority group….. Planning shall serve the unprivileged as well…. with special emphasis on those whose voices are not heard…. it shall stand up for their rights, defend them and aspire to achieving their welfare, enable them and achieve their self-realization…. (Planners) shall be committed towards the public and the community alike… through showing subtle sense, listening to different community segments and establishing a dialogue with them by allowing genuine participation in the identification of needs and aspirations…. Professionalism and ethical and moral values lie at the heart of planners' work, and it is their responsibility to adhere to such in the planning process at the Israeli Planners Committee. (Yiftachel 2006).

The Impacts of Al-Nuweima Plan on the Lives of Bedouins

The displacement of Bedouins to Al-Nuweima camp will result in a set of impacts that will affect all aspects of Bedouin life. Such impacts are interrelated resulting in negative consequences on the lives of Bedouins, both current and prospective. However, in this context, such impacts shall be divided into two categories: cultural and social impacts and economic impacts.

Cultural and Social Impacts

At first glance, this plan would seem to be, for someone unfamiliar with the nomadic culture, a modern plan harmonious with modern life and civilization requirements. It may be said that such a description is true for some individuals and young families seeking an urban lifestyle. Yet, this description is not befitting when designed to target Bedouin communities, whether as individuals or families.

Earlier in this study, it was indicated that Bedouins had spread out in low-populated areas in the West Bank (i.e. their current locations of residence, following their displacement from the Negev) and avoided living in refugee camps, which did not suit their lifestyle, customs and traditions. However, they dispersed into clusters comprised of distant-families (as is still currently the case) and were exposed to repeated aggravation by Israeli authorities, making their life unbearable.
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Such aggravations include: prohibiting the erecting of housing structures and the development of basic infrastructure, demolition of structures, and policy of economic pressures collectively aimed at their impoverishment and forceful displacement.

Yet, living under harsh conditions, according to nomadic culture, is considered more dignified than losing their lifestyle. However, Israeli practices aim at making them abandon their nomadic lifestyle, by compelling Bedouins to choose between a life of poverty under a nomadic lifestyle or a life offering stable economic conditions, but requires abandoning traditional ways of life. Such reflects the violations and harassments practiced by the Israeli occupation against Bedouin communities, as families and individuals as well. The Bedouin lifestyle is one of the core values by which Bedouins had been nurtured to preserve since their early childhood. According to Barakat: “Bedouins adhere to a set of values that are directly linked to their daily pattern of life. Such values include simplicity, common sense, endurance of hardships, patience, purity of the soul and candor”, (Barakat 1987: 76). Abu Suleiman added: “Our norms, traditions and Bedouin lifestyle prevent us from living in Al-Nuweima camp.

Bedouin life, as a pattern of life, requires many components. Components are linked to the livestock and the availability of large areas of land over which Bedouins erect their tents or dwellings. Spacious areas, however, enable family members, elders and children, males and females alike, to move around and practice their life in a natural and comfortable manner. No strangers from other families are allowed to trespass the private area of the family unless by prior approval from that family. Durook al-Beit (the sanctity of the house in Arabic) is one of the traditions of Bedouin culture that is strictly maintained to this day. The sanctity area varies, but it is no less than 50 longitudinal meters. This area involves all the living components of a Bedouin family: family houses and facilities, stockyards as well as spaces allocated for women for conducting their chores. Furthermore, Bedouin families are distributed in the Bedouin community by degree of kinship, and thus, they maintain a distance between different families. Yet, each Bedouin gathering is comprised of one “Hamula” (extended family) related by kinship and composed of two or three generations at most.

Land uses specified in the plan, area of each land plot, allocation for each
Bedouin family and conditions for obtaining a building permit are all incompatible with the Bedouin lifestyle described earlier. The allocation of a half a dunum, or even a two-dunum-area, does not commensurate with a Bedouin lifestyle, which Bedouins have been keen to maintain in spite of the pressures exerted against them by the Israeli occupation. Statements obtained from Bedouins describing this plan reveal their fear of its implementation. For example, we quote: “a cemetery”, “a definite camp”, “a massacre”, “it will turn into a spot for ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) indicating the level of potential violence, “like placing one’s self in a grave”, “impossible”, “go there...definitely killing me”, “exterminating us”, “ruining our lives” and “rather die”, etc.

The displacement of Bedouins by Al-Nuweima plan would result in restricting women’s freedom and disabling their engagement in the public sphere, given that Bedouin communities are highly conservative compared to other sectors of Palestinian society. However, the current prevailing Bedouin lifestyle is consistent with their conservative culture without putting pressure on women or constraining their freedom; as the space for sanctity is maintained and allows for sufficient space for women to move within and conduct many economic activities and chores as well. However, the relocation plan’s threat to women’s freedom may come to expose them to family repression and pressures, depriving them from practicing their economic and domestic activities outside, and possibly even family-honor-related issue. Jamil describes this situation, saying:

“Listen, we, as Bedouin families, live by customs and traditions. Yet, we have a social life in this community, and we communicate and our women and children live their life as well. However, moving to live in such a camp would mean locking women up and depriving them from their current life of freedom. This is hard to be understood for the Israelis and foreigners who believe that women do not enjoy any level of freedom in Bedouin communities. If we move to the suggested community, the doors of our houses would be locked and women would be prevented from being seen by anyone, since families around are strangers and Bedouins do not bond in marriage with stranger Bedouin families. For example, the majority of marriages in al-Hamadeen family occur within the same family. If a family member
wishes to marry someone from another family, a conflict may ensue over this, making the living situation worse by being in the camp.

Examining the plan, one would find that it lacks solutions to address the issue of the natural growth in population. The allocation of half a dunum, or even one dunum area of land, for each family enables the family to establish two housing units, according to the plan, while others would be left without any solutions for their residency. As a result of the economic impacts, which may potentially result due to the implementation of this plan, and which will be addressed later in this study, young people planning to get married would not be able to move to separate housing units, leading them to establish extended family dwellings. This would ultimately result in significant family complications. A consequence is also high population density, given that high fertility is one of the features of Bedouin families, i.e. the average family size exceeds 10 members. Moreover, this would also result in unlicensed random buildings as well as land uses for purposes other than those intended. Therefore, such will lead to making the visual scene of the plan esthetically unpleasing and unhealthy, which is considered visual pollution. This may lead to anxiety, frustration, and negative mental health. Furthermore, this would significantly increase the pressure on women and confine their freedom of movement to the walls of the house given that extended families involve males living in the same house, hence, restricting the movement of the sons’ wives to their bedrooms. Heneiti concluded that the family system in al-Jabal Camp and the development process are contradictory, given that families shift to nuclear families and extended families thereafter.

Practically, the resettlement process had resulted in the transition of Bedouin’s residential lifestyle from a Bedouin one into a village residential lifestyle, i.e. moving from tents to stone-built dwellings. In the beginning, nuclear families were formed and each family obtained a house in which the parents and unmarried family members resided. Nine years following the resettlement process, those families have been transformed into extended families given the lack of dwellings and lands as well, the deteriorating economic situation. Such has prevented new generations from establishing separate dwellings, leading married sons to allot a room from the family’s residence to live in. (Heneiti 2010: 192).
The high likelihood of potential disputes, quarrels and crimes among Bedouin families, belonging to the same family or to other clans and tribes, represents another aspect of the negative implications of forced accommodation of Bedouins under Al-Nuweima plan. Such disputes would occur as a result of population congestion in settings which Bedouins are unaccustomed to live within, and are inconsistent with their culture, let alone the limited area of house sanctity. According to Khamays, the increase in violence rates in Palestinian cities and villages inside the Green Line is attributed to reasons associated with “schematic violence”, given that planning of Arab cities and villages are inappropriate and inconsistent with the conditions, aspirations, desires and needs of citizens. This means that the lack of planning, or the imposition of imported plans by government authorities, in Arab towns systematically attack their social fabric, which has impacts not only limited to the short term, but the long term as well. Moreover, such an attack would result in scaling up the circumstances in which different violent phenomena may originate from (i.e. house demolitions, disputes between families over land boundaries, minimizing of public space, trespassing, etc.). Collectively, a state of alienation is created between citizens and their environment, resulting in the loss of the sense of tranquility and ease in regards to their present and future.

On the other hand, Bedouin communities face the challenge of the presence of old longstanding conflicts among Bedouin tribes and clans, some of which are still dictating behavior and attitudes of Bedouins towards each other. Such issues would evolve into crimes should such communities be grouped in close proximity to each other. However, it is worth noting that this issue was among the issues that were unanimously brought up by Bedouins in length, being a source of equal concern to that of diminishment of their Bedouin lifestyle and culture. Jamil describes the situation, saying:

Firstly, that area is tribal anyway…. We cannot inhabit that area or even go there for good pastures in Spring, since it is not the area of the clans which we belong to. Secondly, if we live there, there would still be the issue of sensitivity among families, possibly due to old disputes, which are still present. Therefore, the idea of going to Jericho is totally rejected by us.
Abu Mohammed Zheiman adds:

For me, Al-Nuweima plan is a massacre, an execution for me and my kin alike. People do have disputes and disagreements with their siblings or even sons; so how am I going to get along with people who are total strangers to me coming from al-Khan al-Ahmar and becoming my neighbors. Also, some people have vengeance with others. Do you want to see people killing each other? Tell them Abu Jamil al-Hamadeen said before you make us go there you need to provide each of us with a Kalashnikov rifle indicating the magnitude of crimes that may occur.

Economic Impacts

Forced displacement often results in extremely severe humanitarian conditions given that people are disenfranchised of their economic resources, making them more dependent on humanitarian aid. In the case of Bedouin displacement under Al-Nuweima plan, all Bedouins, individuals and households alike, oppose moving to Al-Nuweima, thus a forced displacement. In other cases, the Israeli Civil Administration closes in on Bedouin cluster, demolishing their houses and confiscating their economic resources in pressuring them to relocate to proposed Bedouin gatherings. The Israeli occupation stated that it does not want to transfer Bedouin communities forcibly, but it will demolish their houses and confiscate their livestock otherwise.

Roughly 90% of Bedouins are either entirely or partially dependent on livestock for income. Therefore, being transferred to the “urban village” in Al-Nuweima would deprive them from their source of income leading them to seek alternative economic resources. However, in light of the poor economic conditions in the West Bank, seeking livelihoods would be extremely difficult, especially that many Bedouin individuals have no other profession. Consequently, unemployment will increase along with poor quality of life and social ills, in contradiction with concepts of sustainable development. Jamil describes this situation, saying:

“Secondly, young men will be jobless. They will neither work in Israeli settlements nor in security services. Thus, they will eventually end up as drug addicts or thieves. This means that each option will be worse than the other”.
Agricultural work, including animal husbandry, is the most convenient economic option for Bedouins. Yet, such an option is lacking in the planned Bedouin “urban village” of Al-Nuweima. Abu Suleiman describes:

“It is true that our livestock is little, but so far we do have livestock. If we say that the availability of the livestock is 50%, moving to Al-Nuweima, however, would mean 100% nonexistence of livestock. This means no source of income. Let me assumingly say that I have now two to five unemployed young men, moving there would make that number increase to four to five, which means exterminating our life. Now we can work for a week and spend another three weeks with few sheep, but if we move there this would mean annihilating us.”

In a similar case, the forced displacement of 150 families (belonging to al-Salamat of al-Jahaleen family) to al-Jabal Camp in the late nineties, have resulted in depriving residents from their economic resources leading to their employment as cheap labor in Israeli settlements with very limited employment opportunities and thus, resulting eventually in a humanitarian crisis in the camp. The findings of a joint study, conducted by UNRWA and BIMKOM, involving the analysis of case studies indicated that “the process of forced centralized grouping of rural gatherings has created a situation that is (1) socially non-viable and (2) economically un-sustainable. The report evidently illustrates that the financial compensation that has been secured through courts did not guarantee the social, economic or cultural security of Bedouin refugees in the village of Arab al-Jahaleen, (BIMKOM and UNRWA 2011: 11).

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the percentage of poor individuals in urban communities and camps is higher than their percentage in rural areas, amounting to 13.7%, 16.2% and 7.4% respectively. Results have also indicated that members of large-sized households were the poorest, with the highest poverty rate among members of households consisting of 10 members or more. In addition, members of households mainly dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods have recorded the highest rates of poverty prevalence (34%), (PCBS 2012: 33).

The above statistical results indicate that households who are mainly dependent on agriculture have scored the highest poverty rates, while rural communities are
the poorest Palestinian communities. Such would initially seem contradictory. However, the likelihood of diversity of income sources per capita is greater in villages where individuals can work in agriculture in addition to engaging in other economic businesses in sectors such as services, industry, construction, etc. Thus, in creating a state of complementarity poverty is address.

However, this is not the case in Bedouin communities where the issue of high poverty rates is a challenge. Such high rates are attributed to several reasons all stemming from the Israeli practices targeting these communities, including minimizing grazing areas along with other factors inter alia (i.e. high feed prices, growing household size, and reduction in livestock). As size of prohibited grazing land increases, so does dependency on animal feed in feeding livestock. Each animal requires approximately 1kg of feed at a cost of 1.7 NIS, in addition to other resources and medication. Bedouins, however, manage to adapt with such harsh conditions due to the diversity of their income sources; Bedouins seek additional sources of income, such as employment in settlements as well as construction work in Palestinian cities and villages in maintaining their livestock and Bedouin lifestyle.

Furthermore, forced displacement of Bedouins to Al-Nuweima camp would exacerbate poverty among Bedouin households in that community; as living in that camp would come to mean that Bedouins would be stripped of their livestock. Such would lead them to seek other alternative income sources, which, if available, would fail to address the issue of poverty due to large family sizes.

Bedouins residing in the central area of the West Bank are experiencing extremely severe humanitarian conditions due to the Israeli practices against them. Thus, immediate solutions are needed to address this situation beyond humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, the solutions proposed for Bedouins by the Israeli Civil Administration entail their resettlement in locations that are somehow similar to refugee camps, an option which Bedouins have opposed since their displacement from the Negev following the 1948 Nakba and in the early 1950s as well. This option meant opting to abandon some privileges of camps amidst the harsh Nakba conditions. However, living in camps currently is far more tragic, as such settings
Palestinian Bedouin Communities, Planning or Forced Displacement?

are inconsistent with Bedouin needs and lifestyle. Jamil says: “After being displaced in 1948, Bedouins refused to be placed in camp as their lifestyle contradicted with that of the camps. So, why is it thought that Bedouin would accept living in a camp in 2014?”

Bedouins demand that the design of such plans be consistent with their lifestyle, their needs associated with such a lifestyle and in locations fitting their interests and desires. Otherwise, they demand to return to their original lands in the Negev, from which they have been displaced. Moreover, Bedouins demand that their gatherings in which they currently reside be planned, being that they are the most appropriate for their needs and lifestyle. Some Bedouins, however, want to have agricultural villages in their current locations of residence. Abu Suleiman elaborates:

We even suggested establishing a Bedouin style village. I cannot live with an area of merely 3 meters separating my house and my neighbor’s. Houses should be 2020- meters apart according to Bedouin lifestyle and culture. I cannot live this way and even if a house is built for me today I would abandon it the next day. We live in tents. We suggested the notion of an agricultural village for Bedouins. Our plans as Bedouins are the ones that should be implemented, not the occupation’s. This is our point of view; their plan would mean the eradication of Bedouin life and culture. Bedouins, by this plan, will end up either as beggars, robbers or working in menial jobs. They cannot be employed since they do not obtain high academic degrees. Even Palestinians with PhDs are unemployed, so, what do you think would be the case for the illiterate? What kind of job opportunity can be offered to them?

The options proposed by Bedouins to address their issue with the Israeli Civil Administration are the most effective given that such options would succeed in achieving all forms of sustainable development: economic, social, cultural and environmental.
Conclusion

Bedouins are dispersed across the West Bank. However, Bedouins in the central area of the West Bank are distributed in three main tribes: al-Ka’abneh, al-Jahaleen and al-Rashaydeh. The vast majority of those Bedouins, however, originate from the Negev desert from which they have been displaced after the Nakba. Therefore, about 70% of Bedouins in the Central West Bank are refugees.

Since the Nakba, Bedouins have been opposing the option of living in refugee camps as the most of the displaced Palestinians had. Rather, they preferred living in open spaces appropriate for grazing in order to sustain their lifestyle and culture. In spite of the Israeli violations and harassments targeting Bedouin gatherings (manifested in limiting grazing areas, declaring closed military zones, demolishing tents, barracks and cattle sheds, prohibiting the development of infrastructure services, including health and education) Bedouins maintained their lifestyle and culture which is mainly dependent on livestock.

Furthermore, due to changes imposed by Israeli policies, Bedouins in the West Bank are constantly re-defining their lives in order to maintain the privacy of the Bedouin household and meet their psychological, social, cultural and economic needs. Therefore, they live in low-populated gatherings in distant houses depending on their degree of kinship and the area of house sanctity (which is no less than three dunums, and is considered the private space for each family by which women are guaranteed freedom to move around and meet household and economic needs).

The plan, prepared by the Israeli Civil Administration for the accommodation of about 12,500 Bedouins had been designed without consultation or dialogue with Bedouins. Moreover, this plan does not meet the psychological, cultural and economic needs of the targeted Bedouins. It proposes the establishment of a camp-like location rather than urban villages for the accommodation of Bedouins. As the Bedouins oppose the plan, their relocation would amount to their forcibly displaced. Furthermore, the spatial engineering and use of spaces, as determined by the plan, is inconsistent with the Bedouin culture and strips them of their traditional sources of production (livestock) as well, will make them dependent on waged labor in light of the accelerated increase in the unemployment rates in the Palestinian society.
This study has practically addressed the social, cultural and economic impacts of Al-Nuweima plan on the lives of the Bedouins. The key findings and recommendations concluded by this study are listed below:

1. The eviction of Bedouins to Al-Nuweima is forced displacement in all means of the term.
2. The nature of this plan, including the use of spaces, would result in the eradication of Bedouin culture.
3. Many Bedouin families and tribes, targeted for forced displacement, have conflicts and disputes with each other, which will exacerbate and evolve into daily struggles should they be grouped in one location.
4. Grouping Bedouins under Al-Nuweima plan would deprive more than 90% Bedouins from their traditional livelihoods, leading to the exacerbation of poverty and conflicts in the gathering.
5. The displacement of Bedouins to Al-Nuweima will rest in decreasing the Palestinian national production of red meat and milk, which will lead to dependency of food imports, especially from Israel, as well as deepen food insecurity and poverty.
6. The plan does not take into account the natural increase in the number of Bedouins, leading to the exacerbation of the issues of housing and high population density.
7. The plan does not take into consideration the needs of Bedouin women in accordance with the Bedouin culture, resulting in the restriction of Bedouin women’s freedom.
8. The plan by nature and design contradicts with the concept of sustainable development, which basically depends on expanding people’s choices.
9. The most effective solution to the issue of Bedouins in the West Bank is establishing a process of consultation with them, getting their feedback, designing plans compatible with and maintaining the Bedouin lifestyle and culture.
10. The majority of Bedouins demand to be consulted in the design of plans, for plans to be appropriate for their lifestyle and culture, to be implemented in their current locations, until such time that they are allowed to return to their original lands north-east of the Negev.
11. A Bedouin collective voice needs to be unified, as well as the activation of Palestinian authority, NGO, and donor involvement towards protecting Bedouins steadfastness and achieving justice in development and service delivery.

12. Governmental decisions favoring Bedouins need to be initiated; through advocacy campaigns, legal memorials, and demonstrations (i.e. calling for transparent budget allocations, political and diplomatic actions, and execution of previous decisions).

13. Local and international NGO’s should develop projects aimed at supporting the steadfastness of Bedouin communities and enhance services afforded to them.

14. Governmental and local institutions should be lobbied to adopt long term sustainable development plans for Bedouin communities and not to limit aid and interventions to present needs (i.e. decreasing prices of animal feed, exempting agricultural production from added value taxes, etc.).
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Annexes
A Focus Group Workshop
for Presenting and Exploring the Results of
Study on Impacts of Displacement Plans on Bedouin Gatherings
Jericho- December 16, 2014

The Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center (JLAC) called for a focus group workshop (held in Jericho on Tuesday December 16, 2014) for the discussion of the study prepared for JLAC by the researcher Ahmad Heneiti. The study addressed the social and economic impacts which the Bedouin displacement plans will have on the gatherings’ lives.

Participation in the workshop included representatives of a number of Bedouin gatherings targeted for displacement (i.e. Al-Nuweima, Khan al-Ahmar and Fasayel areas), with the attendance of the representative from Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture specializing in livestock (and mandated with Bedouin affairs), representatives of the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), Union of Health Work Committees, as well as, representatives from among the health and agricultural coordination committees of the Palestinian NGO Network. In addition to JLAC representative, a delegate from the German Representative Office in Ramallah (supporting the study and the Bedouin advocacy campaign) was also in attendance.

The workshop served to present the results of the study, verifying the credibility of the information contained as well as to verify whether its findings and recommendations have been agreed upon by Bedouin representatives. Moreover, the workshop aimed at enabling government representatives and Palestinian NGOs in adopting the recommendations and working on their implementation.

After introducing participants, the researcher, Heneiti, provided a visual presentation of the study and responded to inquiries raised by the attendees. This was followed by an extended discussion tackling the issues faced by Bedouins in general. The following conclusions and recommendations were reached:

Ratification of information and conclusions contained in the study and adoption of recommendations, as well as building on them.
Need to include further materials in the study pertaining to other forms of pressures exerted against Bedouins, including the deprivation of basic services, restriction on water resources, confiscation of equipment and machinery, etc.

Need to include a summary on PNA's positions and policies involving Bedouins in the study.

Two additional recommendations were suggested:

Governmental decisions favoring Bedouins need to be initiated: through advocacy campaigns, legal memorials, and demonstrations (i.e. calling for transparent budget allocations, political and diplomatic actions, and execution of previous decisions). Governmental and local institutions should also be lobbied to adopt long term sustainable development plans for Bedouin communities and not to limit aid and interventions to present needs (i.e. decreasing prices of animal feed, exempting agricultural production from added value taxes, etc.).

Local and international NGO's should develop projects aimed at supporting the steadfastness of Bedouin communities and enhance services afforded to them.

A range of steps are needed, starting with: organizing a meeting with the Minister of Agriculture, facilitating a meeting with the Prime Minister and hastening the formation of a national, governmental, popular and civil committee to support the steadfastness of Bedouins.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By Dr. Théo Boutruche and Professor Marco Sassòli

This Expert Opinion was requested in the context of recent renewed efforts by the Israeli military, through its Civil Administration (Israeli Civil Administration, ICA), to remove rural Bedouin communities from their current location in the central West Bank occupied by Israel. The main site being propagated by the ICA for the relocation is Nuweima in the region of Jericho in Area C, adjacent to Area A. While the Expert Opinion relates to a broader pattern of displacements that affected Bedouin communities over the past six decades, including the displacement from their ancestral lands in the Negev desert, a matter still pending before Israeli courts, it also focuses on the specific case of Nuweima. It primarily looks at determining whether, should the plans be carried out, the displacement to Nuweima would amount to a forcible transfer prohibited under the international law of belligerent occupation and the link with other obligations of the Occupying Power. Furthermore, the issue of displacement being closely associated with Israeli policies and practices, notably the repeated use of seizure orders, forced evictions and demolitions and the related Israeli claim that Bedouins have no ownership of the land, the Expert Opinion also addresses the significance of the local laws in the legal assessment of the transfer and the lawfulness of such policies and practices, either in relation to contributing to the qualification of forcible transfer or as such under international law. In that regard it also addresses the extent to which international human rights law provides additional obligations upon Israel.

The Expert Opinion provides an analysis of the interplay of Israel’s obligations as an Occupying Power under the international law of belligerent occupation with other applicable law. Although Israel has the obligation pursuant to Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations to restore and ensure public order and safety and may claim it is doing so when planning to displace the Bedouins for lack of land ownership or lack of building permits based on local laws, this obligation is also limited by specific International Humanitarian Law (IHL) prohibitions, notably the prohibition of forcible transfers (Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV, GCIV), the prohibition of destruction of private property (Article 53 of GCIV and Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations) and the prohibition to transfer parts of its own population into the occupied territory (Art. 49 (6) GCIV). The Expert Opinion further stresses that the Occupant’s legislative power to achieve its obligations is also restricted by Article 43’s duty to respect, unless absolutely prevented, existing law. It therefore reviews the plans to displace some of the remaining Bedouin communities to Nuweima under the prohibition of forcible transfer and the relevance of the Israeli argument of the lack of land ownership based on the interpretation of preexisting local law. It also addresses the lawfulness of Israeli associated policies and practices.

Firstly, Article 49 of GC IV, interpreted in its context and according to well-established international jurisprudence, prohibits equally forcible transfers within an occupied territory. The opinion also shows that the term “forcible” must be interpreted broadly, beyond the specific use of physical force and can result from a set of circumstances constitutive of a coercive environment. Regarding the particular case of the plan to relocate Bedouins to Nuweima, the Experts conclude that this plan if materialized, would amount to a prohibited forcible transfer, all conditions being met. In particular no security considerations can be invoked as a justification for an evacuation as foreseen in
Article 49(2) and the forcible character of the transfer would be established, even if some individuals give their consent, due to the continuing coercive environment Bedouins suffer from.

The Expert Opinion also finds that Israel’s positive obligation to restore and ensure public order and civil life cannot be used to carry out a forcible transfer. The ICA argument of the Bedouins’ lack land rights under local laws does not make the displacement lawful under international law, due to the controversial nature of the measures taken by the ICA to obtain the land in the first place. For example the declaration of “state land” and the related reinterpretation of local laws by the ICA can be seen as a violation of the obligation not to amend the legislation of the occupied territory. The Expert Opinion further shows that it is artificial to restrict the presence of Bedouins in the central West Bank to a question of legal land ownership right, given the fact that their very traditional of life is nomadic. Additionally, in determining whether this is the case, an occupying power must take into account the specificities of Bedouin communities and of their relationship with the land on which they settle or which they use. The recognition and development of the rights of indigenous peoples suggests that for communities such as Bedouins too, a broader understanding of land rights, beyond the mere question of ownership is necessary. Finally the rationale behind the transfer being the use of land for the development of settlements, this cannot in any way be construed as falling within the scope of the maintenance of public order and civil life as foreseen in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. The creation of a settlement within the occupied West Bank for the purpose of relocating Israeli citizens is in itself a violation of Article 49 (6) of GC IV that prohibits the Occupying Power to deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

Although individual responsibilities can only be determined through a judicial proceeding, the Expert Opinion concludes that if the plans are carried out they may amount to a grave breach of the GCIV under Article 147 of GCIV. Third States are expected under their obligation to ensure respect of IHL to exert pressure on Israel to prevent the forcible transfer to Nuweima.

Finally this Expert Opinion concludes that international human rights law (IHRL) also binds Israel as an Occupying Power, in particular in Area C where it has exclusive control such as over the eastern periphery of Jerusalem and Nuweima. Relevant IHRL norms may therefore complement existing prohibitions under IHL, providing further protection, either in terms of additional guarantees prior to the displacement or when considering the situation of those displaced as a result of the transfer. Israel is in particular bound by the IHRL guarantees and rights relevant in the context of the displacement process, including the right to adequate housing (Article 11 of ICESCR) and the freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family and home (Article 17 of ICCPR) and right to health (Article 11 and 12 of ICESCR). Even independently of the unlawfulness of the transfers, Human Rights standards set out safeguards to be respected as part of the process leading to the displacement such as the rights to be consulted and informed.

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Prof. Marco Sassoli

Date: 22 September 2014

Dr. Théo Boutruche
 الخارطة توضح مخططات الترحيل مخططات النويدمة

Map Indicating al-Nuweima Relocation Plan

New ICA Master Plans in Nueima Area

produced by Dror Etkes - 16/9/2014
ICA plans shape files obtained with the courtesy of Bimkom
Map Indicating Expansion of the Illegal Israeli Settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim towards Jerusalem “E1” project
Actual Model for Social Engineering Showing the Private Space within Bedouin Culture
نموذج توزيع وتخصيص المساحات داخل حدود قطعة أرض تخص عائلة بدوية

Actual Model for Social Engineering Showing the Private Space within Bedouin's Culture
Actual Model for Social Engineering Showing the Private Space within Bedouin’s Culture